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Abstract. Two classical problems in economics, the existence of a market
equilibrium and the existence of social choice functions, are formalized here
by the properties of a family of cones associated with the economy. It was
recently established that a necessary and sufficient condition for solving the
former is the nonempty intersection of the family of cones, and one such con-
dition for solving the latter is the acyclicity of the unions of its subfami-
lies. We show an unexpected but clear connection between the two prob-
lems by establishing a duality property of the homology groups of the nerve
defined by the family of cones. In particular, we prove that the intersec-
tion of the family of cones is nonempty if and only if every subfamily has
acyclic unions, thus identifying the two conditions that solve the two eco-
nomic problems. In addition to their applications to economics, the results
are shown to extend significantly several classical theorems, providing unified
and simple proofs: Helly’s theorem, Caratheodory’s representation theorem,
the Knaster-Kuratowski-Marzukiewicz theorem, Brouwer’s fixed point theo-
rem, and Leray’s theorem on acyclic covers.
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1. Introduction
A classic problem in economics is the existence of a market equilibrium (Von
Neumann [37], Nash [32]). This can be viewed as a zero of a nonlinear map Ψ :
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RN → RN representing market excess demand and embodying optimal behavior of
the traders (Arrow and Debreu [3]). The zero can be located by homotopy methods
(Eaves [23], Hirsch and Smale [30]). Smale [34, 35] has reexamined an intuitively
appealing dynamical system which is compatible with a field of cones of directions of
improvement for the economy. Along its solution paths all traders gain and proceed
until no more gains can be attained and an equilibrium is reached. However, unless
the economy satisfies strong boundary conditions, this process may not converge
and the market equilibrium may fail to exist.
Another classic problem in economics is the existence of social choice functions,
(Arrow [5]). These can be viewed (Chichilnisky [8]) as maps which assign to each
vector of individual preferences a social preference, Φ : P k → P, where P is the space
of preferences and k is the number of individuals. Φ must satisfy certain properties
which derive from ethical considerations such as symmetry, an equal treatment
condition. The problem has a clear topological structure. A map Φ exists for a
given k only when a certain topological obstruction disappears. It exists for all k
if and only if the space P is topologically trivial (Chichilnisky and Heal [15]). In
general, the space P is infinite dimensional and has nontrivial homology, so a social
choice rule may fail to exist [8, 14].
Both problems are fundamental to the organization of society. Their solutions
model social agreements about how to allocate the resources of the economy among
competing individuals, the market solution providing an allocation which is efficient
(Arrow [2]) and the social choice solution one which satisfies certain ethical prop-
erties. The solutions represent different types of “social contracts”.
While these two problems appear to be quite different and have been considered
separately until now, we show that, in a well-defined sense, they are the same. We
provide here a topological formulation of these problems which allows us to identify
each with apparently different properties of a family of cones which is naturally asso-
ciated with the economy. It was recently shown that the existence of a competitive
equilibrium requires the family of cones to intersect; the existence of social choice
functions requires that all subfamilies have acyclic unions (Chichilnisky [12, 13]).
Looking at the problem in its simplest and most general form, we obtain a topolog-
ical characterization of a family of finitely many sets in a general topological space
that is necessary and sufficient for the family to have a nonempty intersection1.
One main result is that an acyclic or convex family has nonempty intersection if
and only if every subfamily has acyclic union (Theorem 6 and Corollary 2), but
the results extend to nonacyclic, nonconvex families as well (Theorems 9 and 10).
As a by-product, we establish the identity between the two classical problems in
economics, namely, the existence of a social choice function and of a competitive
equilibrium (Theorem 11).
The topology of our family of cones contains crucial information about the econ-
omy. The homology of its nerve defines a topological invariant for the economy
which provides answers to global problems such as, for example, whether a market
equilibrium exists (Theorems 1, Corollary 2, and Theorem 11). Furthermore, this
invariant allows us to decide whether every subeconomy has a competitive equilib-
rium (Theorem 11(b)). The homology of this nerve also contains information about
the global convergence of the classic price adjustment process in Smale [34, 35] (see
1This result was first established in Chichilnisky [9].
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Chichilnisky [18])—it determines whether this process converges.
The homology of the nerve of a family of sets also provides valuable information
in a number of other applications in fields other than economics, which appear
as additional by-products of the results in this paper. These include substantial
extensions and unified proofs for classical theorems which have until now been con-
sidered disparate: Helly’s theorem on n+ k convex sets in Rn, k > 1 ([27, 28, 1]),
which is used extensively in game theory, for example, Guesnerie and Oudu [25];
Caratheodory’s theorem and its relative the Krein-Milman theorem, both of which
are used in representation theory to characterize the extreme elements of the cone of
positive harmonic functions on the interior of the disk (Choquet [20]); the Knaster-
Kuratowski-Marzukiewicz (KKM) theorem (Berge [6]), which is frequently used to
prove the existence of the core of a game (Scarf [33]); the Brouwer fixed point theo-
rem, which is the nonretractability of a cell onto its boundary and is used to prove
existence of solutions of simultaneous equations (Hirsch [29], Arrow and Hahn [4]);
and Leray’s theorem on the isomorphism between the homology groups of a space
and those of the nerves of an acyclic cover (Leray [31], Dowker [22], Cartan [7]).
These classical theorems of Helly, Caratheodory, Leray, and KKM are extended here
to simple and regular families of arbitrary finite cardinality, consisting of sets which
need not be open nor acyclic or even connected and which are contained in general
topological spaces, including infinite-dimensional spaces; our results generalize also
the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem which appears as an immediate corollary. In
addition, our topological approach allows us to obtain conditions which are simul-
taneously necessary and sufficient for nonempty intersection of a general family of
sets (Chichilnisky [9]), a result which we find here very useful and which was not
available before.
Here is a summary of the paper. In §§2–4 we set out the context and describe
the problems of existence of a market equilibrium and of a social choice function. A
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a market equilibrium—called
limited arbitrage—is defined as the nonempty intersection of a family of cones. A
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of social choice functions—called
limited social diversity—is defined as the acyclicity of the unions of subfamilies of
the same family of cones. Our task is to prove that the two conditions are in fact
identical. This identity (Theorem 11) is a corollary of the results in §5.
Section 5 studies the problem in a general form. First we prove a duality result
which relates the reduced singular homology groups of the union and the inter-
section of a subfamily in dimensions which are complementary with respect to its
cardinality [9]. This analysis is used to prove that all subfamilies up to a certain
cardinality have acyclic unions if and only if they have acyclic intersections. Then
we establish that the whole family has a nonempty acyclic intersection if and only
if all the reduced homology groups of the union of its subfamilies up to a certain
cardinality vanish.
We further extend the results to families of sets which need not be open, acyclic,
or even connected in order to obtain a condition for the nonempty intersection of
the family, whether or not this intersection is acyclic. The results thus provide a
topological characterization of families of sets which have a nonempty intersection.
In particular, this characterization shows that a convex family has a nonempty
intersection if and only if all its subfamilies have acyclic unions. Therefore, lim-
ited arbitrage is identical to limited diversity, and the problems of existence of a
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competitive equilibrium and of social choice functions are the same.
Sections 6 and 7 apply the results in §5 to extend a number of classical theorems
and to provide simple, unified proofs to such disparate results as Helly’s theorem,
Caratheodory’s representation theorem, the Knaster-Kuratowski-Marzukiewicz the-
orem, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, and Leray’s theorem on acyclic covers. Our
extensions of these classical results include families of sets in arbitrary topological
spaces to which the earlier results do not apply, sets which need not be open, con-
vex, acyclic, or even connected. The families may, in addition, be of arbitrary finite
cardinality. Section 7 establishes the identity between the problem of existence of
a competitive equilibrium and the problem of existence of social choice functions.
2. Definitions
We consider collections of finitely many sets in a topological space X , denoted
{Uα}α∈S , with set of indices S. Such a collection is called a cover of X when
X =
⋃
α∈S Uα; it is an open cover when each set is open in X . The term family will
be used to describe a collection of finitely many sets {Uα}α∈S in X whose union⋃
α∈S Uα may or may not cover X. An open family in X is a family consisting of
sets which are open in X. A subset of indices in S will be indicated by θ ⊂ S; each
subset θ ⊂ S defines a subfamily {Uα}α∈θ of the family {Uα}α∈S . We shall use
the notation Uθ for the intersection of the subfamily indexed by θ, Uθ =
⋂
α∈θ Uα,
and Uθ for its union Uθ =
⋃
α∈θ Uα.
H∗ will be used to denote reduced singular homology, and Hq(Y ) to denote the
q-singular reduced homology group of the space Y ; reduced singular homology is
defined by replacing the usual chain complex
· · ·C2 → C1 → C0 → 0
by
· · ·C2 → C1 → C0 → Z → 0,
where Z are the integers and C0 → Z takes each 0-simplex to 1. The corresponding
reduced singular homology groups denoted Hq(Y ) are defined for all q ≥ −1. The
standard 0-singular homology of Y is the direct sum H0(Y )⊕Z. Note that with this
notation if Y is a nonempty connected space, then H0(Y ) = 0 andH−1(Y ) = 0; and
if Y has two connected components, then H0(Y ) = Z. If Y is empty, H0(Y ) = 0
and H−1(Y ) = Z. It is immediate that with this definition the Mayer-Vietoris
sequence (Spanier [36, §6, Chapter 4]) extended to reduced singular homology
· · ·Hq+1(A ∩B)→ Hq+1(A)⊕Hq+1(B)→ Hq+1(A ∪B)→ Hq(A ∩B)→ · · ·
is exact.
We say that a space Y is acyclic if and only if H∗(Y ) = 0. Since by definition the
space Y is nonempty if and only if H−1(Y ) = 0, in our notation Y is called acyclic
when Y is not empty and is acyclic in the standard singular homology. When the
space X is contained in a linear space, a family is called convex if it consists of
convex sets. A family {Uα}α∈S is called acyclic if, for all θ ⊂ S, the set Uθ is either
empty or acyclic.
For any k ≥ 0 we say that the family {Uα}α∈S satisfies condition Ak if the
intersection Uθ is acyclic for every θ ⊂ S having at most k + 1 elements.
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For any k ≥ 0 we say that the family {Uα}α∈S satisfies condition Bk if the union
Uθ is acyclic for every θ having at most k + 1 elements.
If X ⊂ Rn, then the family {Uα}α∈S is called a family in Rn and is called a
family of k sets if S has cardinality k.
If X is a simplicial complex with set of vertices S, then a simple cover of X is an
open cover {Uα}α∈S of X satisfying cl(Uα) ⊂ star(α) for all α ∈ S , where cl(Y ) is
the closure of Y and star(α) is the interior in X of the union of all closed simplices
in X having α as a vertex.
The sets in a simple family need not be convex nor acyclic or even connected. A
subcomplex L of a simplicial complexK is a subset ofK (that is, if s ∈ L⇒ s ∈ K);
a subcomplex L is called full if each simplex of K having all its vertices in L belongs
to L (Spanier [36]). The symbol [α]α∈θ denotes the full subcomplex of X with set
of vertices {α}α∈θ.
A cover of the simplicial complex X by finitely many closed sets {Cα}α∈S is called
regular if ∀θ ⊂ S, [α]α∈θ ⊂
⋃
α∈θ Cα.
A regular cover {Cα}α∈S of a simplicial complex X therefore satisfies: for every
subset θ ⊂ S and every simplex ∆ of X whose vertices lie in
⋃
α∈θ Cα, we have
∆ ⊂
⋃
α∈θ Cα. The sets in a regular cover need not be convex, acyclic, or even
connected.
Given a set X and a collection{Uα}α∈S of subsets of X , the nerve of {Uα}α∈S is
the simplicial complex having as vertices the nonempty elements of {Uα}α∈S and
whose simplexes are finite nonempty subsets of {Uα}α∈S with nonempty intersec-
tion (Spanier [36]).
3. Market equilibrium
3.1. A market economy. A market economy is described by its goods and its
traders. There are n > 1 goods and H > 1 traders. Traders derive utility from
vectors (called trades or bundles of goods) in Rn, which is called the consumption
or trade space. Each trader is identified by a vector describing his/her initial en-
dowments of goods Ωh ∈ Rn − {0} and by a real-valued smooth (C2) function
ui : R
n → R which describes the utility derived from the different consumption
vectors. The space of allocations is RnH ; its elements describe the assignment of
one consumption vector in Rn for each trader. The utilities ui are increasing:
∀x, y ∈ Rn, if x ≥ y, then ui(x) ≥ ui(y), and ∃ ∈> 0 : Dui(x) >∈, where Dui(x) is
the gradient vector of ui at x. If for some r ∈ R the set u
−1
i (r,∞) is not bounded
below in Rn, then we assume that the set of directions of gradients of the cor-
responding hypersurface, {v = Dui(x)/‖Dui(x)‖ : ui(x) = r}, is closed in R
n.
This assumption is to control the behavior at infinity of the leaves of the foliation
of Rn induced by the hypersurfaces of the function ui; geometrically, one rules
out “asymptotic directions” for the gradients on those hypersurfaces which are not
bounded below. A market economy E is therefore defined by its trade space and
its traders: E = {Rn,Ωi, ui, i = 1, . . . , H}.
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3.2. Market equilibrium. Our next tasks are to motivate and then to define the
notion of a competitive equilibrium for the market E. A competitive equilibrium
represents a rest point of the trading activity of the economy E. Trading requires
prices. A price is a rule which assigns a real number called value to each bundle of
goods in a way that depends linearly on the bundles. Therefore, prices are vectors
in the dual space of the space of trades, Rn. Each price p ∈ Rn determines the
budget set of a trader B(p,Ωi) consisting of those trades which are affordable at the
traders’ initial endowment Ωi. Therefore, B(p,Ωi) = {x ∈ Rn : 〈p, x〉 = 〈p,Ωi〉},
where 〈., .〉 is the inner product in Rn. Traders trade within their budgets in order
to increase, ideally to optimize, their utility.
Trading comes to a rest when a price p∗ ∈ Rn is found at which the correspond-
ing set of all optimal trades {x∗i }i=1,... ,H is compatible with the resources of the
economy, i.e., the supply of each of the n goods equals the demand. A competitive
equilibrium of the market economy E is therefore defined as a vector of prices and
of trades, (p∗, x∗1 · · ·x
∗
H) ∈ R
n ×RnH , satisfying the following conditions:
ui(x
∗
i ) = Max
xi∈B(p∗,Ωi)
ui(xi)(1)
for B(p∗,Ωi) = {x ∈ R
n : 〈p∗, x〉 = 〈p∗,Ωi〉}
and
H∑
i=1
(x∗i − Ωi) = 0 ∈ R
n.(2)
The vector x∗i (p
∗) is the demand of trader i at prices p∗; a solution xi(p) to
problem (1) for all p ∈ Rn is the demand function xi(p) : Rn → Rn of trader i.
ED(p) =
∑H
i=1(xi(p)−Ωi) is the aggregate excess demand function
2 of the economy
E. Condition (2) means that at the equilibrium allocation all markets clear, i.e.,
total demand for each good equals total supply, and therefore ED(p∗) = 0.
3.3. Market cones. Consider a market economy E = {Rn,Ωi, ui, i = 1, . . . , H}.
The asymptotic preferred cone Ai is the cone of all directions which intersect every
hypersurface of ui of values exceeding ui(Ωi) :
Ai = {v ∈ R
n : sup
λ∈(0,∞)
ui(Ωi + λv) = sup
x∈RN
ui(x)}.(3)
The market cone Di is
Di = {p ∈ R
n : ∀v ∈ Ai, 〈p, v〉 > 0}.(4)
If the utility ui is a concave function, then both cones Ai and Di are open convex
sets, which we now assume. The condition of limited arbitrage (LA) is that all
market cones in (4) intersect:
(LA)
H⋂
i=1
Di 6= ∅.(5)
2The demand and the aggregate excess demand functions may not be well defined for some
prices which are not equilibrium prices.
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This means that there exists a price p ∈ Rn at which only limited increases in
utility can be achieved by all traders from trades which are affordable from their
initial endowments.
The following has been established:
Theorem 1. Limited arbitrage (5) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of
a competitive equilibrium in the market E.
For a proof see Chichilnisky [12].
The condition for existence of a competitive equilibrium is therefore the nonempty
intersection (5) of a family of cones in Rn which are naturally associated with the
economy E, namely, of the family of market cones {Di}i=1,... ,H defined in (4). The
market cones {Di}i=1,... ,H contain global information about the economy, since they
establish directions of utility increases along which all utility levels are eventually
reached. As established in Theorem 1, the market cones {Di}i=1,... ,H determine
whether or not the market has a competitive equilibrium. They also determine
whether or not the dynamical process revisited in [34, 35] converges globally; it
converges if and only if limited arbitrage holds, i.e., if and only if the family of
cones has nonempty intersection (see Chichilnisky [18]).
The family of market cones {Di}i=1,... ,H also contains information about the
existence of social choice functions. In the next section we shall see that a condition
for existence of a social choice function is that every subfamily of the family of
market cones, {Di}i=1,... ,H , has an acyclic union.
4. Social choice functions
4.1. Individual and social preferences. In this section we consider a connected
and simply connected CW complex P (Spanier [36]) representing a space of pref-
erences on Rn. The explicit cell structure on P is not needed, only the general
topological properties of CW complexes. For example, P could be a polyhe-
dron or a smooth manifold. P k denotes the product of P with itself k times,
P k =
k times︷ ︸︸ ︷
P × · · · × P , and ∆P is the “diagonal” of P k = {(p1 · · · pk) ∈ P k : ∀i, j =
1, . . . , k, pi = pj}. Examples of spaces of preferences P are provided in §7.
4.2. Social choice functions. A social choice function for the space of prefer-
ences P and for k individuals, is a continuous map Φ : P k → P assigning to each
vector of k individual preferences in P k a social preference in P satisfying:
1. Φ is symmetric; i.e., Φ is invariant under the action of the group of permuta-
tions of k letters acting naturally on P k.
This condition means that all k individuals are treated equally and is called
anonymity.
2. The map induced by the restriction of Φ on ∆(P k) at the homotopy level,
(Φ | ∆(P k))∗ : pij(∆(P k))→ pij(P ), is onto ∀j.
This condition arises from several applications [14, 16]. For example, it is implied
by the Pareto condition [10], which requires that when all individuals prefer one
choice x to another y, so does society. It is also implied by the assumption that
Φ | ∆(P k) = id(∆(P k)); i.e., when Φ is restricted to the “diagonal” of P k, ∆P k =
{(ρ1 · · · ρk) ∈ P k s.t. ∀i, j, ρi = ρj}, it is the identity map. This latter condition
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means that when all individuals have the same preference, society adopts that
common preference, and it is called respect of unanimity [8].
An allocation is an assignment of a bundle of goods in Rn to each trader, and the
space of allocations is RnH . Each trader has a preference over allocations. A smooth
preference over the space of allocations RnH is a smooth (C2) unit vector field
ρ : RnH → SnH−1 satisfying: ∃u : RnH → R with ∀x ∈ RnH , ρ(x) = λ(x)Du(x)
for some λ(x) > 0 (Debreu [21]). The space of all smooth preferences on allocations
in RnH is denoted Γ(RnH). The space of preferences P (Eθ) similar to those of a
subset θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H} of traders in E is
P (Eθ) =
{
ρ ∈ Γ(RnH) : ∀x ∈ RnH and ∀j, ρj(x) ∈
⋃
i∈θ
Di
}
,(6)
where ρj(x) is the projection of ρ(x) on the jth copy of Rn in the product space
RnH . The interpretation is that P (Eθ) consists of all preferences which are similar
to those of some trader i ∈ θ in some position j in the sense that they increase in the
directions of large utility increases for i in position j and only in those directions.
This is discussed further in §7. Note that the notion of similarity of preferences
depends on the same family of market cones {Di}i=1,... ,H defined in equation (4)
in §3.
4.3. Social choice and the topology of preferences. In its most general form
the problem of existence of social choice functions has no solution; for the space
Γ = Γ(Rm) of all smooth preferences on Rm, m > 2 :
Theorem 2. There exists no map Φ : Γk → Γ satisfying 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 ∀k ≥ 1.
A proof is in Chichilnisky [8, 10].
A natural question is what spaces of preferences P admit a social choice function.
The following is known:
Theorem 3. There exists a social choice map Φ : P k → P satisfying 4.2.1 and
4.2.2 ∀k ≥ 1, if and only if P is acyclic.
This was proved in Chichilnisky [8] and Chichilnisky and Heal [15].
When a social choice function Φ : P k → P exists, then by Whitehead’s theorem
(Spanier [36]) P is contractible, since the space P is acyclic and by assumption
pi1(P ) = 0. Therefore, there exists a continuous deformation of the space of prefer-
ences P into one preference. For this reason, in this context the acyclicity of a space
of preferences establishes a limit on social diversity (Heal [26]). For any given subset
θ of traders in E, θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H}, a social choice function Φ : (P (Eθ))k → P (Eθ)
exists satisfying the required conditions ∀k > 1 if and only if P (Eθ) is acyclic.
This in turn means that the space of gradients of the preferences in P (Eθ), namely,⋃
i∈θDi,must be acyclic. We say the market E has limited social diversity or simply
limited diversity (LS), when:
(LS) ∀ θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H}, θ 6= ∅⇒
⋃
i∈θ
Di is acyclic.(7)
A consequence of Theorem 3 is:
INTERSECTING FAMILIES OF SETS 9
Theorem 4. There exists a social choice function Φ : P (Eθ)
k → P (Eθ) satisfying
4.2.1 and 4.2.2, ∀θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H} and ∀k ≥ 1, if and only if the market E has
limited social diversity (LS).
This follows from Chichilnisky [8] and Chichilnisky and Heal [15].
4.4. Social choice and the nerve of market cones. For a social choice func-
tion Φ to exist, the union of every nonempty subfamily of market cones {Ui}i=1,... ,H
must be acyclic. We saw in §3 that the existence of a competitive equilibrium re-
quires the nonempty intersection of the same family of market cones,
⋂H
i=1{Di} 6= ∅.
To identify the two economic problems, we must exhibit the connection between two
properties of the family of cones. One is that the family has nonempty intersection—
i.e., limited arbitrage (5). The second is that the union of every subfamily is
acyclic—i.e., limited diversity (7). This is achieved in Theorem 11 in §7 and moti-
vates the results in the following section.
5. Duality and intersecting families
Having established the importance in economics of the topology of the nerve
of the market cones {Di}i=1,... ,H , we turn now to the mathematical problem. In
their simplest and most general form the questions are: when does the family of
market cones {Di}i=1,... ,H have a nonempty intersection, and how does this relate
to the acyclicity of the unions of its subfamilies? The nonempty intersection of
this family of cones is the condition of limited arbitrage (5), and the acyclicity of
the unions of its (nonempty) subfamilies is the condition of limited diversity (7).
We saw in §3 that the former (5) is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
market equilibrium and in §4 that the latter (7) is necessary and sufficient for the
existence of social choice functions. This section will establish inter alia that the
two mathematical conditions (5) and (7) are identical.
Here is a summary of the section.3 Theorem 5 proves the equivalence between
two topological conditions of the nerve of a family of sets of a general topological
space X—these are conditions Ak and Bk defined in §2, the former requiring that
all subfamilies with at most k + 1 elements have acyclic intersection and the lat-
ter requiring that all such subfamilies have acyclic unions. This identity is simple
and geometrically appealing. It has many implications, as we show below. Be-
cause it is close to the foundations of homology theory, there is a subtle point in
its proof, which ensures an excision property for singular reduced homology (see,
e.g., Spanier [36, p. 189]) so that the Mayer-Vietoris sequence for reduced singular
homology—a sequence which is rarely used for families where the sets may have
empty intersection—is exact. A discussion of this exactness for reduced homology
for families which includes empty sets is in §2, and the excision property is discussed
in this section after condition (6).
The exactness of the Mayer-Vietoris sequence is used in our proof of a duality
property of the singular reduced homology of a family of sets in Proposition 1.
This proposition establishes a simple isomorphism between the singular reduced
homology groups of the union and those of the intersection of a subfamily in di-
mensions complementary with its cardinality. This duality property allows us to
prove the following somewhat surprising result in Proposition 2: For families in
3The results in this section were first established in Chichilnisky (1981).
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RN the conditions Ak and Bk need only be required for subfamilies with at most
N + 1 sets; they are automatically satisfied otherwise. The geometric implications
of these results are shown in Corollary 1, which shows that, if the family is acyclic
and every subfamily with at most N +1 sets has a nonempty intersection, then the
whole family has a nonempty intersection.
Building on this, Theorem 6 gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the
acyclic (and therefore nonempty) intersection of every subfamily of a family of
finitely many sets in a general topological space X ; the union of every subfamily
must be acyclic. Furthermore, if the family of sets is in RN , the acyclicity is required
only for subfamilies with no more than N + 1 sets. For acyclic families, Corollary
2 gives a simple, necessary, and sufficient condition for the nonempty intersection
of the whole family; particularly, the family has nonempty intersection if and only
if every subfamily has an acyclic union. This result is just what is needed for the
economic applications presented in §§3 and 4, as seen in Theorem 11 in §7.
So far we have considered families which have either empty or acyclic intersec-
tion and have excluded those where the sets have nonempty intersection, but this
intersection is not acyclic. In several applications, for example, for non-convex
economies it is necessary to consider the condition of limited arbitrage (5) which
requires nonempty intersection, even when this intersection fails to be acyclic. Here
Mayer-Vietoris is no longer useful, and other arguments are needed. The rest of
this section extends the results to families which may have nonacyclic as well as
nonempty intersection. This is achieved as follows: Theorems 7 and 8 establish an
isomorphism between the homology of a space X and that of the nerve of a simple
and of a regular cover respectively, as defined in §2. These include covers by sets
which may be neither open, convex, acyclic, or even connected. Using this isomor-
phism, Theorems 9 and 10 prove necessary and sufficient conditions for nonempty
intersection; these are similar to Theorem 6, but they are valid for simple and for
regular families respectively.
Unless otherwise stated, the following results apply to a general topological space
X, and the family {Uα}α∈S satisfies⋃
α∈S
Uα =
⋃
α∈S
(intUS (Uα)) ,(8)
where intUS (Uα) denotes the interior of the set Uα relative to the set U
S =
⋃
β∈S(Uβ).
A family satisfying this property (8) is called an excisive family. Since we can take
X =
⋃
α∈S Uα, (8) is a rather general specification. For example, (8) is satisfied
when the family consists of sets Ui ⊂ X , each of which is open in X . Note, how-
ever, that condition (8) does not require that the sets Ui be open in
⋃
α∈S(Uα).
In fact, (8) is strictly weaker than the requirement that the sets Ui be open in X ;
it includes, for example, families consisting of two closed sets C1 and C2 in R
n
with C1 ⊂ C2. The role of (8) is to ensure the union and the intersection of any
subfamily of {Uα}α∈S define an excisive couple so that the Mayer-Vietoris sequence
of reduced singular theory is exact (see Spanier [36, Theorems 3, 4 and Corollary
5, pp. 188–189]). An example in [36, p. 188] exhibits two closed path-connected
sets Y1 and Y2 in R
2 such that Y1 ∪ Y2 = R2 which do not satisfy (8) and for
which the corresponding singular Mayer-Vietoris sequence is not exact. Condition
(8) prevents such pathologies.
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Theorem 5. An excisive family {Uα}α∈S in X satisfies Ak if and only if it satisfies
Bk.
Proof. The first step in the proof is to establish the following duality result:
Proposition 1. Consider an excisive family of sets in X, {Uα}α∈S, satisfying
Ak−1, for k ≥ 1. Then if θ ⊂ S has k + 1 elements, for all q
Hq(U
θ) ≃ Hq−k(Uθ).(9)
Proof. We proceed by induction. When k = 1, the family has two sets, and this is
the Mayer-Vietoris sequence for reduced singular homology as defined in §2. Assume
the result is true for every family {Uα}α∈θ where θ has k elements. Consider now
a family {Uα}α∈τ of k + 1 elements satisfying Ak−1. Define θ so that τ = {0} ∪ θ,
and Vα = U0∪Uα , α ∈ θ . The new family {Vα}α∈θ has k elements, and it satisfies
Ak−2 because the family {Uα}α∈τ satisfies Ak−1 and by Mayer-Vietoris. Then
Hq(U
τ ) = Hq(V
θ) = Hq−(k−1)(Vθ) by the induction hypothesis
= Hq−k+1(U0 ∪ [U1 ∩ · · · ∩ Uk])
= Hq−k(U0 ∩ [U1 ∩ · · · ∩ Uk]) by Mayer-Vietoris
= Hq−k(Uτ ),
completing the proof of the proposition. The rest of the proof of Theorem 5 follows
from Proposition 1 by induction on k.
Proposition 2. Let {Uα}α∈S be an excisive family in Rn satisfying An . Then
{Uα} also satisfies Ak and Bk for all k ≥ n. In particular, the intersection of this
family is always nonempty.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 5 and Mayer-Vietoris, because Hi(U) = 0 for
i ≥ n for an open set U ⊂ Rn.
Corollary 1. Let {Uα}α∈S be an acyclic excisive family in R
n with at least n+ 1
elements. If every subfamily with n + 1 elements has nonempty intersection, then
the whole family has a nonempty intersection.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 2 because An is satisfied by acyclicity.
Example 1. The conditions of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 cannot be relaxed.
In general, the family must have finite cardinality. Consider, for example, the
infinite family in R1{Ui}i=1,2,..., Ui = (i,∞). Every subfamily of {Ui}i=1,2,... has
acyclic union, but the whole family has empty intersection. Figure 1 shows that
Corollary 1 does not hold for nonacyclic families; each three of these four sets in
Figure 1 intersect, but the whole family has an empty intersection. Figure 2 also
shows that Proposition 2 is not true when An is not satisfied. Here n = 2, and A2
is not satisfied because the union of two of the sets is not acyclic.
Theorem 6. Let {Uα}α∈S be an excisive family of k ≥ 2 sets. Then the intersec-
tion of every subfamily
⋂
α∈θ Uθ, ∀θ ⊂ S, is acyclic (and hence nonempty) if and
only if the union of every subfamily
⋃
θ Uα , ∀θ ⊂ S, is acyclic; i.e., the family
satisfies Bk−1. If the family {Uα}α∈S is in Rn, then its intersection is acyclic if
and only if its union
⋃
α∈S Uα is acyclic and it satisfies Bj for j = min(n, k − 2).
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Figure 1 Figure 2
Figure 3 Figure 4
Proof. The first statement follows from Theorem 5. For the second statement, first
let j = k − 2. Assume that
⋃
α∈S Uα is acyclic and {Uα}α∈S satisfies Bk−2. Then
Bk−1 is satisfied. By Theorem 5 so is Ak−1 so that the intersection of the family is
acyclic and thus nonempty. Reciprocally, if the intersection of the whole family is
not empty, then Ak−1 is satisfied and by Theorem 5 so is Bk−1 so that the union of
the family is acyclic. Now let j = n. By assumption and Theorem 5, An is satisfied.
By Proposition 2 this implies that the whole family has nonempty intersection and
that Am is satisfied for all m ≥ 0. Therefore by Theorem 5, Bm is satisfied for all
m, and the family’s union is acyclic.
Example 2. Figures 2 and 3 show that the conditions of Theorem 6 cannot be re-
laxed. Figure 2 shows that “acyclic intersection” cannot be replaced by “nonempty
intersection”; it depicts two sets which do intersect but have a nonacyclic union.
Figure 3 shows that Theorem 6 is not true if we replace “acyclic union” by “con-
tractible union” in its statement; it depicts two “comb” spaces having an acyclic
(and hence nonempty) intersection, the point {x}. The union of the two comb
spaces is acyclic, confirming Theorem 6, but it is not contractible.
Corollary 2. An acyclic excisive family {Uα}α∈S has nonempty intersection if and
only if ∀θ ⊂ S, the union of the subfamily {Ui}α∈θ,
⋃
α∈S Uα, is acyclic.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 6 and the definition of acyclic families.
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Example 3. The conditions of Corollary 2 cannot be relaxed. Figure 4 depicts a
family of k = 4 sets in R2 which does not satisfy B2 (or A2) because three of them
do not intersect. The union of the family is acyclic, but the intersection is empty.
Until now we considered families which had either empty or acyclic intersection.
The following results apply to simple and regular families, as defined in §2. These
may consist, for example, of sets in Rn which are neither open nor acyclic or
even connected. The families may have nonacyclic, nonempty intersection. Mayer-
Vietoris is not useful in this context, and we must adopt a different approach.
If X is a simplicial complex, the expression X = nerve {Uα}α∈S is used to
indicate that X and nerve {Uα}α∈S have the same combinatorial structure.
Theorem 7. Let {Uα}α∈S be a simple cover of a simplicial complex X with set of
vertices equal to S. Then X = {Uα}α∈S.
Proof. The proof follows by induction on the number of sets k. Let the set of vertices
S consist of k = 2 elements. Then X is either a segment or a set of two points;
assumeX is a segment. Consider x ∈ ∂U1. Since x /∈ U1, x ∈ U2. Therefore, ∃y ∈
U1∩U2. Now let X = {x1}∪{x2}. Since Uα ⊂ star(α), U1∩U2 is empty. Consider
now the following inductive assumption for a set of vertices S of k + 1 elements:
the nerve {Uα} = X , and if the k sets {Uα}1≤α≤k intersect, then ∃ a simple family
{Wα}1≤α≤k+1 covering X with Wα ⊂ Uα∀α and an x ∈ ∂W1 ∩ · · · ∩ ∂Wk. Now
let S have k + 2 sets. Assume X is a k + 1 simplex. By the inductive hypothesis
every subfamily of k+1 sets in {Uα} intersects, and in particular, ∃ a simple family
{Wα}1≤α≤k+1 with x ∈
⋂
1≤α≤k ∂Wα . Let Zk+1 =Wk+1− Ix, where Ix is a closed
segment in W1 ∩ · · · ∩Wk, and x ∈ ∂Ix. Take Zk+1 to be an element of the simple
family {Zα}1≤α≤k+2 defined otherwise by Zα = Wα for α ≤ k and Zk+2 = Uk+2.
Then ∀α, Zα ⊂ Uα, {Zα}1≤α≤k+2 covers X , and x ∈ ∂Z1 ∩ · · · ∩ ∂Zk+1, so
x ∈ Zk+2. Therefore, x ∈
⋂
1≤α≤k+2 Zα ⊂
⋂
1≤α≤k+2 Uα 6= ∅. Finally, if X is not
a simplex,
⋂
1≤α≤k+2 Uα = ∅, since Uα ⊂ star(α) for all α ∈ S.
The following result uses the definition of regular covers given in §2.
Theorem 8. Let {Cα}αǫS be a regular cover of a simplicial complex X. Then nerve
{Cα}α∈S = X .
Proof. First we prove that Theorem 7 implies that if {Cα}α∈S is a regular cover
of X , then
⋂
α∈S Cα 6= ∅. Let Dα = Cα ∩ star(α); then
⋃
α∈S Dα = X . Now by
Theorem 7
if {Uα}α∈S is a simple family covering X with Uα ⊃ Dα for all α,
⋂
α∈S
Uα 6= ∅.
(10)
We now use (10) to prove
⋂
α∈S Dα 6= ∅ , by induction on k.
Case k = 1. If
⋂
α=1,2Dα = ∅, then ∃U1, U2 defining a simple family with⋂
α=1,2 Uα = ∅, contradicting (10). Now let S have k+1 elements: by the inductive
assumption,
⋂
1≤α≤k Ck 6= ∅. If [
⋂
1≤α≤k Cα] ∩ Ck+1 = ∅, then ∃ a simple family
{Uα} s.t. [
⋂
1≤α≤k Uα] ∩ Uα+1 = ∅, contradicting (10). Thus
⋂
α∈S Dα 6= ∅ so that⋂
α∈S Cα 6= ∅.
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Having established the result for the case where X is a simplex, the rest of
the proof follows the proof of Theorem 7 by considering the family defined by the
complements of the sets {Cα}α∈S in X .
The two following theorems extend the results of Theorem 6 to the cases of simple
and regular families as defined in §2; here we are concerned with the nonempty
intersection of the family, whether or not this intersection is acyclic.
Theorem 9. Let {Uα}α∈S be a simple family of k sets, such that every subfamily
with k − 1 elements has a nonempty intersection. Then the whole family has a
nonempty intersection if and only if its union
⋃
α∈S Uα is acyclic. If k > n+1, we
need to require only that every family of n+ 1 sets has a nonempty intersection.
Proof. By assumption the (k − 2)-skeleton of nerve {Uα}α∈S is the boundary of a
k − 1 simplex. Let X = {Uα}α∈S . By Theorem 7 nerve {Uα}α∈S = X . Therefore,
all sets in the family {Uα} intersect if and only if its union X =
⋃
α∈S Uα is
acyclic.
Theorem 10. Let {Cα}α∈S be a family of k closed sets with [α]α∈σ ⊂
⋃
α∈σ Cα,
and
⋂
α∈σ Cα 6= ∅ for every subset σ of S with k − 1 elements. Then
⋂
α∈σ Cα 6= ∅
if and only if
⋃
α∈σ Cα is acyclic. If k > n+ 1, we need to require only that every
family of n+ 1 sets has a nonempty intersection.
Proof. This follows from the proof of Theorem 9, replacing Theorem 7 in the proof
by Theorem 8.
6. Extensions of theorems of Helly, Caratheodory, KKM,
Brouwer, and Leray
The question of when sets intersect was studied in the classic theorems of Helly
[27, 28] and of Knaster-Kuratowski-Marzukiewicz in [6]. They provided conditions
which are sufficient for a family of sets in Rn to have a nonempty intersection, but
their results are restricted to families with n+ 1 or more sets in the case of Helly’s
theorem and to families with exactly n+1 sets in the case of KKM’s theorem, in both
cases having either a convex structure or other particular characteristics. These two
results are quite specific to the problems they study and appear to be different from
each other. However, the problem of nonempty intersection in its general form has
a clear geometrical structure and can be dealt with by using topological tools. We
showed in §5 that no restrictions on the number of sets is required, nor is convexity,
acyclicity, or even connectedness of the sets. Furthermore, the families need not
be in Rn or in any linear space. Once this is understood, the two classic results of
Helly and KKM appear as special cases of our results. Brouwer’s theorem is also
a special case of our results, since it is known to be implied by the KKM theorem,
as is Caratheodoty’s theorem, which follows from the Helly’s theorem.
Helly’s theorem is connected here to the Brouwer’s fixed point theorem and to
an extension provided here of Leray’s theorem on acyclic covers. Our extension of
Leray’s theorem (Leray [31], Dowker [22], Cartan [7]) is in Theorems 7 and 8 of
§5; while Leray’s theorem applies to acyclic covers and proves the isomorphism of
the homology of the nerve of the cover and that of the union of the family, our
Theorems 7 and 8 significantly extend this result for covers consisting of sets which
may not be acyclic nor open or even connected.
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This section therefore exhibits how the results in §5 extend and unify several
classical theorems. Proposition 2 in §5 extends Helly’s striking theorem on the
nonempty intersection of families in Rn having more than n + 1 sets (Helly [27],
Alexandroff and Hopf [1]) to possibly nonconvex and nonacyclic families with any
number of sets in a general topological space X . Corollary 3 below is Helly’s
theorem. Since Helly’s theorem implies Caratheodory’s representation theorem
(Eggleston [24]), Proposition 2 in §5 extends also Caratheodory’s theorem to the
same wide range of families. Corollary 4 is the Knaster-Kuratowski-Marzukiewicz
theorem (Berge [6, p. 173], which follows immediately as a very special case of our
Theorem 7 in §5. KKM’s theorem is restricted to families of sets in Rn which cover
an n-simplex, while our Theorem 7 applies to families in a general topological space
of any cardinality, which cover any simplicial complex. An additional extension of
the KKM is Corollary 5, which applies to simple families. Corollary 6 is the Brouwer
fixed point theorem (Hirsch [29]). These results exhibit a common topological root
for these classical and somewhat disparate results.
Corollary 3 (Helly’s theorem). Let {Uα}αǫS be a family of convex sets in Rn with
at least n + 1 elements. Then if every subfamily with n + 1 sets has a nonempty
intersection, the whole family has a nonempty intersection.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 2 in §5, which is valid in much more
generality for any number of sets in a general topological space, because convex
sets define an excisive family.
The following corollary requires no convexity:
Corollary 4 (KKM Theorem). Let {Cα}α∈S be a regular cover of a k-simplex X
as defined in §2. Then
⋂
α∈S Cα 6= ∅.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 8, which is valid more generally for
any simplicial complex. Since nerve {Cα}α∈S and X have the same combinatorial
structure, it follows, in particular, that
⋂
α∈S Cα 6= ∅.
In addition, the following result extends the KKM theorem to a different class of
covers, simple covers, as defined in §2, which need not satisfy any of the conditions
of KKM theorem:
Corollary 5 (Extension of KKM to simple families). Let {Uα}α∈S be a simple cover
of a k-dimensional simplex X. Then
⋂
α∈S Uα is not empty.
Proof. This follows directly from Theorem 7, which is also valid for covers of any
complex X .
Since the KKM theorem follows directly from Theorem 8 as shown in Corollary
4, by presenting for completeness a well-known argument, we show that Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem also follows as an immediate corollary of our Theorem 8.
Corollary 6 (Brouwer’s fixed point theorem). Let X be a k-simplex, and f : X →
X a continuous function. Then ∃x ∈ X : f(x) = x.
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Proof. The proof follows by contradiction. If f : X → X has no fixed point, then
it defines a retraction r : X → ∂X . Let ∂X =
⋃
iXi, where Xi is the ith face of
X, a k − 1 simplex. Now define the closed sets Ci = {r
−1(Xi)}, i = 1, . . . , k + 1.
Then {Ci}i=1,... ,k+1 is a closed cover of X satisfying the conditions of Corollary 4,
so
⋂
iCi 6= ∅. But if p ∈
⋂
iCi, then r(p) ∈
⋂
Xi = ∅, a contradiction.
7. Market equilibrium and social choice
Our final task is to establish the equivalence of the two economic problems,
namely, the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the existence of a social
choice function. A good way to start is to provide examples of spaces of preferences
in order to illustrate the topological problem involved in social choice. By Theorem
3 in §4, this problem can be solved only for acyclic spaces of preferences.
A preference ρ is an ordering of the choice space Rn which is induced by a
utility function u : Rn → R, where we indicate x ρ y ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(y). A smooth
preference on Rn is defined by a smooth (C2) unit vector field ρ : Rn → Sn−1, with
the property that ∃ a function u : Rn → R such that ∀x ∈ Rn, ∃λ(x) > 0 such
that ρ(x) = λ(x)Du(x); i.e., there exists a function u such that ∀x, ρ(x) is collinear
with the gradient of u (see Debreu [21]).
One example of a space of preferences P is the space of all smooth preferences on
Rn,denoted Γ(Rn), endowed with the sup norm, ‖ρ− κ‖ = supx∈RN ‖ρ(x)− κ(x)‖.
Another example of a space of preferences is the space PL of all linear preferences
on Rn, which are those preferences induced by linear utility functions on Rn, n > 2.
The space PL is the sphere S
n−1. If the zero preference is also included, we have
the space PLN of all linear preferences on R
n—this space is Sn−1
⋃
{0}. Different
preference spaces arise in different applications (for examples, see, e.g., Heal [26]).
Typically, preference spaces are not linear nor convex or acyclic; for example, the
space of smooth preferences Γ(Rn) is not acyclic [8].
Our last task is to establish the connection between the existence of a market
equilibrium and the existence of a social choice function. Both problems depend on
the characteristics of the traders’ preferences, but they do so in two different ways.
The market E has a finite set of preferences, one for each trader, {ρ1, . . . , ρH}. The
set of preferences in the economy is therefore a discrete finite set of points in the
space of smooth preferences Γ(Rn) defined above. The social choice function, by
contrast, is generally defined on large spaces describing a universe of all possible
preferences, typically a connected subset P of the space of all smooth preferences
in Γ(Rn), which is not a finite set.
In order to exhibit the connection between the two problems—the existence of
market equilibrium and that of a social choice function—we define a space con-
sisting of preferences which are naturally “close” to those of the preferences of the
traders in the economy E. The space of preferences PE consists of a large number
of preferences, assumed to be a connected subspace of Γ(Rn), all of which are, in a
well-defined sense, similar to the preferences in the market E. We therefore need
to define what is meant by a smooth preference which is similar to the preferences
of the traders in the market E.
A smooth preference ρ ∈ P defined over allocations in RnH is called similar
to the preference of trader i ∈ E in position j when ∀x ∈ RnH , the projection
of ρ(x) on the jth copy of Rn is in the market cone of trader i; i.e., ∀x ∈ RnH ,
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ρj(x) ∈ Di. The interpretation of this condition is that the preference ρ increases
in the direction of that of the trader i in position j for large utility values. The
space P (Eθ) of preferences similar to those of a subset θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H} of traders in
E was already defined in §4; it consists of all those smooth preferences ρ ∈ Γ(RnH)
such that ∀x ∈ RnH , ρj(x) ∈
⋃
i∈θDi. If we consider the problem of finding a social
choice function for the space of preferences P (Eθ) which are similar to those of some
subset θ of traders in the economy E, θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H}, then by Theorem 4 in §4
the necessary and sufficient condition is the acyclicity of
⋃
i∈θDi. The existence of
a social choice function for every such space of preferences P (Eθ), ∀θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H}
therefore requires
∀θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H}, θ 6= ∅ ⇒
⋃
i∈θ
Di is acyclic.
Note that in order to solve the social choice problem we must go back to the
properties of the family of market cones {Di}i∈{1,... ,H} of the economy E defined
in (4)—the same family of cones which define the condition of limited arbitrage (5).
Theorem 11 exhibits the identity between the problems of existence of a com-
petitive equilibrium for a market E and the existence of a social choice function.
Let E be a market as defined in §3. A subeconomy Eθ of E is the market consisting
of the those traders in E who belong to the set θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H}, i.e.,
Eθ = {R
n,Ωi, ui, i ∈ θ}.
Theorem 11. The following properties of the economy E = {Rn,Ωi, ρi, i = 1, . . . , H}
are equivalent :
(a) E has a competitive equilibrium.
(b) Every subeconomy Eθ of E has a competitive equilibrium.
(c) Every subeconomy Eθ of E with at most n + 1 traders has a competitive
equilibrium.
(d) There exists a social choice function Φ : P (Eθ)
k → P (Eθ) satisfying condi-
tions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, for every space P (Eθ) of preferences similar to those of the
traders in a nonempty set θ, ∀θ⊂ {1, . . . , H}, and ∀k ≥ 1.
Proof. The equivalence between (a) and (b) follows immediately from Theorem 1
in §3 and from the definition of limited arbitrage (LA) in (5). We establish next
the equivalence of the statements (a) and (c). By Theorem 1, E has a competitive
equilibrium if and only if E has limited arbitrage (LA) as defined in (5), i.e., if and
only if the family of dual cones {Di}i=1,... ,H has a nonempty intersection. Since
{Di}i=1,... ,H is an acyclic excisive family in Rn, by Corollary 1, (5) is true if and
only if every subfamily of {Di}i=1,... ,H with indices in a set θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H} of at
most n+1 elements has nonempty intersection, i.e., if and only if the corresponding
subeconomy Eθ satisfies limited arbitrage (5), and therefore by Theorem 1 if and
only if Eθ has a competitive equilibrium.
The equivalence between statements (a) and (d) follows from Theorem 4 in §4
and from Theorem 6 and Corollary 2 in §5, because {Di}i=1,... ,H is an acyclic
excisive family, so
H⋂
i=1
Di 6= ∅ ⇔ ∀ nonempty θ ⊂ {1, . . . , H},
⋃
i∈θ
Di is acyclic.
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